Inter-rebel Group Alliances in Multi-party Civil Wars: Overcoming the commitment problem -What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? by Meyer-Seipp, K.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inter-rebel Group 
Alliances in Multi-party 
Civil Wars 
Overcoming the 
commitment problem -
What factors make rebel 
group alliances more 
likely? 
K. L. L. Meyer-Seipp (s1053132) 
 
First Reader: Professor N. J. G. van Willigen 
Second Reader: Professor L. J. M .Seymour 
 
MSc International Relations and Diplomacy 
Master Thesis 
June 2012 
 
Word count: 16,364 
 
 
Overcoming the commitment problem - 
What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? 
 
 
2 
 
Keywords: Inter-rebel alliances; rebel groups; multi-party civil war; 
commitment problem; conflict in Darfur 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Under which conditions do rebel groups in multi-party civil wars form 
alliances? This paper proposes that rebel groups, just as nation states, find 
themselves in an anarchic context and as a result are trapped in a multi tiered 
dilemma; on the one hand they face a security dilemma which leads them to 
strive for cooperation, on the other hand they face the commitment problem 
and fear betrayal. This paper looks at three variables ‘identity’, ‘ideology’ and 
‘foreign support’ as factors that are expected to reduce uncertainty, thus 
should help overcome the commitment problem and ultimately increase the 
likelihood that an inter-rebel alliance will form. Looking at two cases of inter-
rebel alliances that formed during the war in Darfur; the Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the National Redemption Front (NRF) this 
analysis presents an exploratory attempt to identify factors and conditions that 
make an inter-rebel alliance more likely.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent decades have seen the emergence of complex, protracted civil wars in 
countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sudan and 
Sierra Leone that derive their high dynamism partially from the constant 
formation, changes and disintegration of alliances between warring groups. Of 
the 259 intrastate conflicts since 1945, approximately thirty have featured 
alliances among rebel groups, with a number of conflicts featuring multiple 
alliances.1 This trend has increased with the emergence of multi-party civil 
wars in weak or failed states - conflicts which Kaldor defines as “New Wars”; 
where “goals and tactics …have substantially changed…” in comparison to 
traditional inter-state was, and which are “focused on capturing political 
control largely within the disintegrating states, [and] are increasingly privatized 
as state control breaks down”.2 In these types of conflicts the actors involved 
have changed. Today, warring groups that are variously known as rebel 
groups, militants, terrorists and freedom fighters constitute “the opposition in 
some of the most intractable internal conflicts around the world”.3 These 
groups have emerged as crucial military as well as political actors, whose 
actions, decisions and interaction can have major consequences for conflict 
dynamic and processes. Inter-rebel group alliances have been responsible for 
the overthrow of incumbent regimes such as the National Resistance Army 
(NRA) in Uganda or the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) in Ethiopia. They have also emerged as an important factor 
responsible for the long duration and complexity of civil wars. The multitude of 
actors involved and changing networks of alliances contribute to the 
“conceptual mess”4 these civil wars represent. It becomes close to impossible 
for outsiders to understand them, since, they often times, do not follow an 
overarching narrative or cleavage. 
In order to further enhance the understanding of the dynamics and processes 
involved in these types of complex, protracted civil wars this paper will attempt 
                                                 
1
 Weintraub (2011) 2 
2
 Levy and Thompson (2010) 190 
3 Furtado (2007) 1 
4
 Stearns (2011) 5 
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to shed light on the formation of inter-rebel alliances within multi-party civil 
wars.  
I. a) The Puzzle   
 
There is a well known axiom which says “the enemy of my enemy is my 
friend, and the friend of my enemy is my enemy”. According to this saying one 
would expect to see many inter-rebel alliances to form in multi-party civil wars, 
since the groups, despite differences, usually fight the same common enemy: 
the incumbent government. In addition, there are many potential gains from 
inter-rebel group cooperation and it can, in fact, become necessary for the 
group’s survival. By combining forces and carrying out joint military operations 
rebel groups can balance the power of their common enemy, who in cases of 
asymmetric civil wars is more powerful. Inter-rebel alliances can thus prove 
vital for the success of a rebellion. Additionally, they can provide practical, on-
the-ground advantages by “induc[ing] civilian support, forcibly recruit[ing] new 
soldiers [and] consolidating their hold on important regions”5. Despite the 
obvious advantages inter-rebel cooperation would present, historical records 
indicate that numerous militant groups fail to form alliances, even when facing 
a more powerful common threat.6 The old maxim “the enemy of my enemy is 
my friend” seems to prove wrong, but why is that?  
This paper argues that rebel groups find themselves in an anarchic context 
very similar to the one faced by nation states in the international system. As a 
result of this context rebel groups find themselves trapped in a security 
dilemma, while at the same time facing a commitment problem: even if a rebel 
group/state is willing i.e. prefers to align with another rebel group/state, 
(because it is aware of its potential advantages) there is no guarantee that the 
other will abide by the agreement. This feeling is mutual and thus the 
uncertainty and resulting mistrust ultimately keeps the groups from engaging 
in an alliance. Within the discipline of International Relations it has been the 
dominant assumption that the “the ability, or the lack of ability, to make 
                                                 
5 Weintraub (2011) 5 
6 Bapat and Bond (2012) 2 
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commitments is a function of the anarchic international system.”7 In the 
context of multi-party civil wars and state collapse, and in the resulting 
absence of institutions that serve as constraining or determining factor, it is 
reasonably contended, that the scope condition for rebel alliances are the 
same as for nation states in the international system: it is anarchic. In this 
context rebel groups face the same problem as states: uncertainty which gets 
“to the very heart of politics” and can be seen as the “existential condition in 
human affairs.”8  
Uncertainty and trust are mutually implicated since trust always develops 
under conditions of uncertainty and never entirely escapes it.9 The question of 
whom to trust is, in the words of political theorist John Dunn, a central 
question of political life.10 When considering the possibility of engaging into an 
alliance with another group, rebel leaders are presented with the dilemma of 
not being able to “trust” the future actions and intentions of their partners. This 
follows Sztompka’s definition of trust:  
 Acting in uncertain and uncontrollable conditions, we take risks, 
we gamble, we make bets about the future uncertain, free 
actions of others. Thus we have arrived at the simple, most 
general definition of trust: TRUST IS ABOUT THE FUTURE 
CONTINGENT ACTIONS OF OTHERS11 
It is one of the defining features of many rebel groups that internal structures 
do not remain stable and that their actions and decisions are not consistent. 
The volatility of rebel group’s structures and unpredictability of their behavior 
does not inspire confidence and trust in a potential ally. Therefore in a civil 
war situation mutual fear of betrayal leads to reciprocal commitment problems. 
 
                                                 
7
 Grieco (1988) 
8
 Booth and Wheeler (2008) 1 
9
 For a discussion on the topic of trust see Booth and Wheeler (2008) 
10
 Dunn (1993) 641 
11
 Sztompka (1999) 25 
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Figure 1: The dilemma facing rebel groups  
In civil wars such as those currently taking place in the DRC, Sudan and Chad 
virtually all groups can claim to be threatened (by the government, other 
ethnic groups, other rebel groups). Often their officially stated reason for 
fighting is derived from a perceived need to protect themselves and their 
respective group from violence and control inflicted upon them by others.12 
These armed movements often “cast the war in terms of a security dilemma” 
in which “not aligning - i.e. waiting it out – is usually not an option” since a 
group’s access to resources and capabilities is conditioned by the behavior of 
other groups.13 Therefore as Christia (2008) argues alliances in multi-ethnic 
failed states are security-driven.14  
Rebel groups in multi-party civil 
wars thus face a multi tiered 
dilemma; they are more or less 
“forced” to form alliances while at 
the same time they cannot trust 
their alliance partner due to the 
commitment problem. 
The question thus arises, what factors and/or conditions can help overcome 
the commitment problem i.e. what factors and conditions help reduce 
uncertainty and thus make inter-rebel alliances more likely? 
 
I. b) Significance of Question and Relevance of Research 
 
The most prominent form of violent conflict today occurs within states, rather 
than between states. Since the end of the Second World War 75% of 
militarized disputes have been civil conflicts.15 At the same time, the most 
prevalent form of civil wars in the contemporary world have been fought 
between states and non-state actors;16 involving sub-national groups such as 
                                                 
12 e.g. Sudanese rebel groups such as SLA and JEM taking up arms against the Janjaweed  
13 Christia (2008) 6 
14
 Ibid., 7 
15
 Pearlman and Cunningham (2012) 3 
16
 Gleditsch et. al (2002) 
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rebels that challenge states and governments. Rebel groups have emerged 
as key players within civil wars but their behavior and interaction remain 
understudied and especially the study of inter-rebel alliances present a gap in 
academic literature.17 This should come as a surprise considering that the 
world is comprised of mostly multiethnic states, 67 percent of which have 
three or more ethnic groups – often caught up in disputes and fights.18 The 
potential for violent conflict is great and therefore the study of rebel groups 
and their interaction is significant. One cannot fully understand civil conflicts 
without noting inter-rebel group interaction such as the tendency of rebel 
groups to form alliances. The study of rebel group alliances, as part of the 
broader study of inter-rebel interaction, is thus an important aspect of civil 
wars and will further our understanding of the dynamics and processes of 
such conflicts. Additionally, insights into rebel interaction and alliance 
formation do not apply solely to conflicts on the national level. They can also 
prove important to conflicts that transcend borders such as larger regional 
conflicts e.g. the conflict raging between Chad, Sudan and Eritrea with its 
trends of trans-boundary rebel group alliances. The study of inter-rebel 
alliances can thus prove to be an essential feature of regional security 
studies,19 especially in such volatile and conflict-prone regions as the Horn of 
Africa or the Great Lake region.  
In addition since rebel alliances have emerged as key players in conflicts their 
closer and systematic examination could also be useful for the broader 
literature on counterinsurgency. However, this subject matter is not solely of 
interest for the study of civil wars and regional security but can also answer 
more general questions of “Groupness” and group formation. Since inter-rebel 
alliances are a type of organization, it is part of the study of the formation of 
political organizations. In addition, they can act as examples for political 
and/or social cohesion of political organizations in the civil war context.20  
                                                 
17
 See Christia (2008), Bapat and Bond (2012), Furtado (2007) 
18
 Toft (2003) 17 and Appendix 1 
19 See Seymour (2010) 
20 
 “Although organizational commitment should be of vital concern for those scholars that 
study the behavior of these groups, there have been few to no studies on the creation of 
organizational commitment in armed groups, whether these groups belong to the state or 
whether they are fighting it.”  Haer and Banholzer (2011) 3      
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Besides the added value for the academic discourse, the study of rebel group 
alliance formation also might prove useful for policy advice. The disunity of 
rebel groups and subsequent fighting between different warring groups is a 
driving factor in many of today’s multi-party civil wars such as the case 
selected for the analysis: the conflict in Darfur. The pivotal issue of the 
Sudanese state and central theme of its histories are the multiple competing 
power centers and lack of internal political cohesion. In the recent Darfur 
conflict the international community, Darfur civil society and many rebel 
leaders made the unification of the rebel groups a priority.21 The unification of 
Darfur rebel groups is seen as a “prerequisite for peace”.22 This is not solely 
the case in Darfur as Nygard and Weintraub (2011) argue: 
 
 The complex constellation of belligerents in civil wars, the 
distribution of capabilities they bring to the table, and their 
ability and willingness to bargain with one another rather than 
engage in violence have profound consequences for civilians 
and state’s long-term prospects for peace.23 
 
Knowing under what conditions inter-rebel alliances are more likely i.e. going 
a step further; under what conditions they are more effective and/or long 
lasting could prove valuable for conflict resolution, prevention and to a certain 
extent even for nation-building.  
This thesis provides a limited account of rebel group behavior that sheds light 
on an important, but understudied, dimension of civil war which lies at the 
intersection of international security and comparative politics and could prove 
invaluable for policy advice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
21
 Tubiana (2011) 142 
22
 Crisis Group, “Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace” Africa Briefing N°32, 6 
October 2005. 
23
 Nygard, Weintraub (2011) 31  
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I. c) Outline 
 
In order to assess what factors make inter-rebel alliances more likely the 
thesis will be divided into the following sections. The first chapter provides an 
overview of the relevant Literature; highlighting in the first part the findings and 
debate of the general International Relations (IR) literature on the traditional 
notions of alliance formation between states as a starting point for the analysis 
on the sub-national level. The second part of the literature review section will 
outline the slowly emerging body of literature specifically targeting inter-rebel 
group dynamics in civil wars and will discuss its findings in light of the topic of 
inter-rebel alliances, thus situating this analysis within the broader context of 
academic literature and discourse. In the second chapter the scope conditions 
and concepts that operate as the basis and backbone for the proposed 
theoretical framework and its consequential hypotheses will be presented and 
discussed. A discussion of the choices made in term of the paper’s research 
design including its methodology and case selection strategy will follow the 
theoretical framework in order to provide for conceptual clarity and clearly 
define the area of focus of this thesis. This chapter also includes a clear 
presentation of the scope and limitations of the analysis, an important aspect 
to consider in the final conclusion. The following section will illustrate the 
theoretical argument and test the proposed hypotheses by closely examining 
two cases of inter-rebel alliances in the Darfur conflict of Sudan: the National 
Redemption Front (NRF) and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M). 
The concluding chapters will provide an analysis of the evidence presented 
and attempt to offer a conclusion. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE  
 
II. a)International Relations Literature in Alliances  
 
The question of rebel group alliances within a civil war context has only very 
recently attracted scholarly attention and so far only a limited number of 
studies have been published. Due to the dearth of specific literature on 
alliance formation in civil wars at this point in time, it is useful to initially 
examine literature from the realm of International Relations (IR) on alliance 
formation between states to explore whether they provide insights to the 
empirical reality of civil wars and its analysis. 
In the realist tradition states are seen as self-interested actors that find 
themselves vulnerable to the threat by other states in the anarchic, 
international system. States are trapped within a Security Dilemma where “all 
fear betrayal”24 and “what one does to enhance one’s own security causes 
reactions that, in the end, can make one less secure”.25 For this school of 
thought, alliances are seen as being at the core of international politics, as 
Kenneth Waltz (1979) argues in his influential theory of the balance-of-power; 
“If there is any distinctively political theory of international politics, balance-of-
power theory is it”.26 According to this theory inter-state alliances are means 
to balance against a more powerful state. Walt (1987) altered this theory in 
1987 into the “balance of threat” where (weaker) states, trapped within a 
security dilemma, align themselves if they consider a stronger state to be a 
threat.27 He concludes that ideological similarities and state-sponsored 
instruments of increasing alliance commitment e.g. foreign economic aid are 
subordinate to security preferences in alliance formation.28 
                                                 
24
 Posen (1993) 28 
25
 Ibid., 28 
26
 Waltz (1979) 117  
27
 Posen (1993) transposed the security dilemma from the Field of IR onto the ethnic context, 
granting state-like characteristics to ethnic groups; an approach which was subsequently 
used by a number of scholars including Christia (2008) and which is also employed for the 
purpose of this paper. 
28
 Waltz (1979)  
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Neither Walt nor Waltz see bandwagoning – siding with the stronger power - 
as an optimal option, while Mearsheimer (2001) regards it as equivalent to 
capitulation. In contrast Schweller (1994) argues that this alliance strategy is 
preferable to others if the objective is profit rather than security. Powell (1999) 
sees no normative difference between alliances strategies and in turn, regards 
them as purely instrumental, solely determined by the specific circumstances 
of the various groups and their objectives.  
Other scholars challenge the realist convention that states solely “balance” 
against material (military) capabilities and argue that state alignment decisions 
are shaped on the basis of a state’s capabilities as well as its intentions. They 
argue that non-material factors such as ideology, common cultural values 
and/or multi-lateral institutions can be at the basis of state’s alignment i.e. 
inter-state alliances.29 
 
There are limits to the transfer of IR concepts to the sub-national and local 
level and one might get into the realm of conceptual stretching. In the IR 
realist tradition states are seen as unitary actors which, both in the case of 
states as well as for rebel groups is a highly simplifying assumption. A number 
of scholars30 recently argued that the study of rebel groups needs to consider 
their inner dynamics and their oftentimes existing internal divisions.31 In 
addition, in contrast to states in the international realm the actors active in civil 
wars are not the same i.e. do not have the same characteristics; there can be 
local rebel groups, national rebel groups, foreign and national governments 
etc. Furthermore, in the case of rebel groups the motivations for fighting, i.e. 
forming an alliance could arguably be very different from the motivation of 
states. A theory on alliance formation between rebel groups can thus not 
simply translate traditional IR concept onto the national level. However, they 
provide insights and basic understanding for the usefulness of alliances 
between different actors: for the context of multi-ethnic civil wars group 
                                                 
29
 See Walt (1987); Ikenberry (2001); Huntington (1996); Shambaugh (2004) 
30
 See Ballentine and Nitzschke (2003); Haer and Banholzer (2011) 
31
 Of course there are differences between rebel groups, some a more unitary than others 
e.g. well-organized groups such as the SPLA under Garang or the LTTE under Prabhakaran 
can be considered more unitary than states, others like the SLA are characterized by internal 
divisions and fractionalization  
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alliances can be seen as based on rational decisions, i.e. choices by the rebel 
leaders to increase security and gain (local) advantages while taking into 
account different power relations.  
 
 II. b) EXISTING LITERATURE ON INTER-REBEL  
  GROUP DYNAMICS 
 
A trend in the civil war literature shows a shift towards a focus on the micro-
dimensions of civil wars relating to violence32; civil war duration33 and 
combatant recruitment.34 Recently Non-state actors (NCAs) such as rebel 
groups have become the focus of a number of academic studies. Although the 
literature on rebel group behavior has expanded rapidly, the focus has been 
on the use of violence against civilians and inner group dynamics e.g. group 
fragmentation.35 The interactions between rebel groups – be it collaboration or 
fighting – remains a new, so far understudied, topic with only a handful of 
scholars currently working on it.36 
The “only existing”37 systematic study of inter-rebel groups violence is a just 
recently published large-N analysis by Fjelde and Nilsson (2012). Using the 
Uppsala Conflict Data Program Non-State Conflict Dataset from 1998 to 2008 
their findings suggest that inter-rebel group violence can be explained as 
strategic actions, rather than opportunistic moves. They identify four 
conditions under which violence between rebel groups is more likely “when 
rebel groups control territory, when they have experienced a splintering of the 
organization, when the state is weak and no longer holds the monopoly power 
to determine territorial or political stakes, and when the rebel group is strong 
in relation to the other groups in the conflict”.38 Inter-rebel violence and 
cooperation are two sides of the same coin; their findings thus could suggest 
                                                 
32
 Downes (2004); Kalyvas (2003 and 2006); Humphreys and Weinstein (2006) 
33
 Fearon (2004) 
34
 Arjona and Kalyvas (2006) 
35
 See Balcells (2010); Humphreys and Weinstein (2008); Johnston (2008); Weinstein (2007); 
Wood (2003); Wood (2010),  
36
 See Christia (2011); Bond (2011); Bond and Bapat (2012) 
37
 Nygard and Weintraub (2011) 3 
38
 Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) 3 
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that cooperation is more likely if rebel groups do not control territory, are 
united and are relatively weak in relation to other groups and the government. 
In “Bargaining between rebel groups and the option of outside violence” 
Nygard and Weintraub (2011) set out to answer the question why rebel 
groups choose to fight each other, despite the fact that (military) cooperation 
could prove useful in defeating the common enemy or extracting concessions 
from an incumbent government. They model the strategic dilemma rebel 
groups face in multiparty civil wars as an alternating-offer bargaining game of 
incomplete information with an outside option which suggests against the 
general notion of neatly dividing rebel behavior into “opportunistic” and 
“strategic” motives.39   
 
This thesis sets out to answer the question under which conditions rebel 
group alliances are more likely and therefore is part of a small but growing 
literature of inter-rebel group cooperation.  
In their text “Alliances between Militant groups” Bapat and Bond (2012) use 
two game theoretic models to specify the conditions under which militants 
(they regard both rebel groups and terrorists) form both bilateral and 
asymmetric alliances, statistically testing their findings using the Uppsala 
Conflict Data Program (UCDP) non-state actor dataset. Their findings suggest 
that “while groups that are less vulnerable to government repression rely on 
the shadow of the future to enforce cooperation, weaker groups require an 
enforcer to sustain alliance cooperation.”40 This enforcer is often a “state 
sponsor” i.e. a foreign state that provides intentional assistance. 
Christia (2008) argues that rebel group alliances in multi-ethnic failed states 
are not driven by the principles of identity or ideology and instead suggests 
that they are “tactical, motivated by a concern with victory and the 
maximization of wartime returns”.41 Her findings suggest that inter-rebel 
alliances are highly opportunistic in that “alliance narratives prove to be a 
product of tactical preferences: elites of the warring parties pick their allies 
                                                 
39
 Nygard and Weintraub (2011) 31  
40
 Bapat and Bond (2012) 3 
41
 Christia (2008) 1 
Overcoming the commitment problem - 
What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? 
 
 
18 
 
based on power considerations and then look to their shared identity 
repertoires for characteristics shared with their allies and not shared with their 
foes”.42 Using case studies of Bosnia and Afghanistan, including Geographical 
Information System (GIS) analysis she comes to the conclusion that within the 
context of emerging anarchy civil war alliances prove to be in “constant flux 
with no stable equilibrium outcome” resulting in a process of “constant 
defection, alliance reconfiguration and group fractionalization”. Similarly to the 
findings of Bapat and Bond (2012), Christia identifies the only factor able to 
attain alliance stability is an “external arbiter [that] can enforce cooperation”. 
In her PhD thesis “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, 
the case of South Asia” Furtado (2007) uses a formal model to highlight the 
importance of credible commitments to the formation of rebel group alliances. 
In her eyes rebel groups can be regarded as “liberators with altruistic aims or 
criminal gangs with materialistic aims “…they differ radically in term of goal, 
ideological orientation but also in term of organizational structure and 
strategies.43 In contrast to Christia’s (2008) findings she argues that identity 
characteristics of rebel groups and other violent non-state actors play a role in 
determining the onset of cooperation among such actors while power 
characteristics influence the design of such cooperative arrangements. She 
comes to the conclusion that groups with symmetric goals and asymmetric 
resource endowments are more likely to form alliances.  
Michael Weintraub suggests in “Fighting together: rebel group alliances in civil 
war”44 that rebel group alliances are driven by two independent variables: 
rebel group weakness after sustained military setbacks as well as group’s 
access to different streams of revenue i.e. rebel groups’ control over 
significant natural resources such as diamonds, oil and coca decreases the 
likelihood of alliance formation.45  
 
This section provided an overview of the existing literature on inter-rebel 
interaction, considering both inter-rebel violence and cooperation.  
                                                 
42
 Christia (2008)  2  
43
 Furtado (2007) 4  
44
 Has not yet been published  
45
 See Weintraub (2011) 
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II. c) SCOPE CONDITIONS AND CONCEPTS 
 
Following both the IR tradition and the trend in the existing Literature on rebel 
group dynamics, this paper follows the rational framework perceiving inter-
rebel group alliances as the result of rational decisions i.e. choices made by 
rebel leaders. Rebel groups i.e. their leaders are benefit-maximizing and 
opportunistic; therefore inter-rebel alliances are, just as any alliance, “for 
everyone involved a means rather than a goal”.46 Alliances are not costless 
and thus are a “product of tactical preferences”47. Potential allies need to 
consider whether the alliance provides a net gain after associated costs are 
covered; they have to consider whether the alliance’s benefit outweighs its 
costs. The alliance thus needs to maximize returns; this instrumental behavior 
should be understood in terms of political control and power rather than in 
terms of goods or capital e.g. through pillage or booty. 
 At the same time rebel groups find themselves in the detrimental context of 
civil wars and often their group’s survival depends on the cooperation and 
support, thus the benefits ultimately outweigh the costs since the alternative is 
extinction. This feature of inter-rebel alliances can also account for the short 
duration of this type of cooperation in many civil wars, since both groups are 
more or less forced to form an alliance but do not invest into them. As soon as 
the conflict dynamic changes ending an alliance and possibly fighting the 
former ally might provide more benefits than continuing the cooperation.  
 
Since “valid concepts are the starting point for sound theories” the definition of 
inter-rebel group alliance used for this work is an extension of Walt’s (1987) 
definition of interstate alliances which is also used by Christia (2008), among 
others.48 A civil war inter-rebel alliance is a formal or non-formal relationship 
between rebel groups and/or other warring parties that provide both with an 
advantage, involves commitment and engenders certain trade-offs.49 It is a 
cooperative arrangement, which can be formal, informal, written or verbally 
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agreed to and which can take the form of joint military operations, sharing 
intelligence, joint training and/or financing. This concept is further extended 
with “inter-rebel alliances” also constituting alignment and coalitions e.g. loose 
coalitions of autonomous factional organizations. Since the interaction 
between rebel groups can take many forms, it proves useful to conceptualize 
the negative value of “alliance”. A “not-alliance” is if the two groups are neutral 
to one another - in the multi-party, anarchic context of “New Wars” a highly 
unlikely scenario - and obviously if there is open conflict and fighting between 
them (not including sporadic disputes and even violence between members of 
the groups).  
The dependent variable ‘formation of inter-rebel alliance’ is a discreet variable, 
since rebel groups can either be in an alliance or not. The indicators for an 
“alliance” will be cooperative arrangement between two (or more) groups 
which can take the form of joint military operations, joint training, sharing of 
intelligence, financial support, sharing of resources and providing shelter. The 
simple announcement of the formation of an alliance e.g. in the News through 
a rebel leader, even if it is accompanied by the signing of an official contract 
or manifesto, is not automatically an indicator for ‘the formation of inter-rebel 
alliance’. In many of the “New Wars” alliances between fighting groups are 
often proclaimed but they do not take shape i.e. are mere “paper-alliances”. 
There must be some evidence that the alliance did exist e.g. through the 
execution of joint military operations over the duration of at least 2 months.50 
 
III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
This paper sets out to identify those factors that make the formation of an 
inter-rebel alliance more likely, basing its analysis on the idea that rebel 
groups face the commitment problem. Since uncertainty, resulting from the 
anarchic context; lies at the root of the commitment problem this analysis will 
consider different factors that may reduce uncertainty thus helping to 
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overcome the commitment problem and ultimately leading to an increase in 
the likelihood of an inter-rebel alliance.51  
 
The study of rebel group alliances in civil wars can be seen as part of the 
general study of group cohesiveness.52 According to Feistinger, Schachter 
and Back (1950), group cohesion is believed to develop from a field of binding 
social forces that act on members to stay in the group.53 One of the most 
important factors influencing group cohesion is Member’s similarity. This might 
also be a factor that reduces uncertainty since the more similar i.e. alike 
members are, the more predictable their behavior should be. In the case of 
inter-rebel alliances Member’s similarity can either take the form of a shared 
or similar identity or ideology. 
 III. a) IDENTITY 
 
Generally identity can be defined as “set of points of personal reference on 
which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit”.54 Since “the world 
is simply too complex a place for us to survive without some means of 
simplifying and ordering it first”55; identity at its core is a “means of reducing 
uncertainty, of making sense of the social world so as to survive and thrive”.56 
According to Hale (2008) one of the fundamental human motivations to form 
identities and different groups is “uncertainty reduction”.57  
Identity is central to grievances in wars in general, and in intra-state conflicts 
in particular. According to Sambanis (2001) “identity” accounted for 70% of 
the civil wars between 1966 and 1999.58 Although grievance identity based 
explanations for civil wars had been pushed aside by scholars, recently there 
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have been a number of works59 that tried to advocate the importance of 
ethnicity in civil wars arguing that the materialist explanations are overplayed 
as part of the grievance based explanations for civil wars.60  
In the context of civil wars identities usually equate ethnic identities. On a 
basic level ethnic groups are important because they satisfy a need to 
belong.61 Studies in evolutionary psychology point to natural selection as 
having resulted in–group versus out-group distinctions and the expectation of 
better treatment from co-ethnics.62 The idea of in-group preference was 
empirically reinforced by Tajfel, Billig, and Bundy (1971), who identified a 
strong trend for cooperation between individuals of the same group. This 
suggests that ethnicity facilitates collective action by structuring actor’s 
preferences to assign positive values to the welfare of fellow group 
members.63 Bates (1983) proposes that ethnicity provides a technology – a 
shared language and/or understanding of modes of social interaction that 
facilitates coordination among co-ethnics.64 According to Hardin (1995) 
ethnicity operates as a focal point which allows individuals to coordinate their 
behavior to include or exclude others. Other scholars who support the claim of 
ethnic identities facilitating collective action include Fearon and Laitin (1996) 
and Hardin (1995). 
Ethnic identity is also said to play an important role in group formation 65 and 
both Tilly (1978) and Gurr (2000) argue that the formation of enduring 
identities are central to mobilizing groups. Similarly, Hale (2007) claims that 
ethnic boundaries are potent cleavages for conflict and that ethnic identities 
have powerful potential for mobilizing groups66.   
Since ethnic identity is a defining aspect for group formation and in the context 
of civil wars an ethnic group provides an “ideal recruitment pool”67, one can 
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argue that they are also an important factor in the decision to form an alliance. 
Therefore, the first hypothesis proposes68:  
 
 Hypothesis 1: If the ethnic identity of rebel groups is the same i.e. 
 is similar, alliances between them are more likely. 
 
In this context it is important to consider what the term ‘ethnic identity’ entails. 
Generally the term refers to a group of people who identify with each other, 
“bound together through a common heritage that is real or presumed”.69 
Scholars such as Kaufman (1996a, 1996b) and Biddle (2006) argue that 
group identities, especially ethnic identities, are unchangeable, visible and 
relatively sticky; almost to the point of being inescapable. This primordialist 
argument leads to the claim that the deep and long-standing differences 
between groups cause conflicts in diverse societies.70 This logic would imply 
that alliances stay along ethnic lines and that they shouldn’t change and/or 
break down, however, conflicts are ”complex and ambiguous processes that 
lead to important shifts and realignments within identity groups”.71 Rebel 
groups, that initially are thought to be homogenous, often break down into 
smaller factions; therefore, identities change as conflicts go on. Following the 
lead of constructivist scholars such as Mitchell (1956), Epstein (1958), Barth 
(1969) and Posner (2005) this paper adopts a conceptualization of ethnic 
identity as “fluid and situation bound”.72 Each person has multiple identities 
and the relevance of one particular identity can increase or decrease 
according to changes in the context. In addition as a number of scholars73 
have argued ethnic identities are not only situational but instrumental, they 
can be, and in civil conflicts often are, “the product of a deliberate decision 
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designed for maximum payoffs” by calculating political and/or military 
leaders.74 
Therefore identity is both rigid, on the level you want to exclude and 
changeable on the in-group level: while an ethnic group can present the 
“lowest common denominator”; within this group there can be again different 
subgroups and factions.  
 
Operationalization of Independent Variable: (ethnic) Identity 
Following the constructivist view that identities are “fluid and situation bound”; 
this paper will regard a group’s identity as fixed and stable, at the specific 
moment of the formation of an alliance. Many identities, especially ethnic 
identities are based on such visible factors as ‘tribal affiliation’, ‘language’ and 
‘religion’. However, while determining the ‘identity’ of a group it is also 
important to consider how it defines itself (in-group vs. out-group distinctions), 
for example in case the sub-group of a tribe (e.g. of a specific area) tries to 
distinguish itself from the larger tribe. Considering that identity, especially 
ethnic identity, is often times instrumentalized by leaders, one needs to 
consider how the group might identify itself e.g. in statements.   
 
Independent Variable Operationalization 
Identity ‘Ethnicity’, ‘Language’, ‘Religion’, 
‘tribal affiliation’, ‘group’s own 
conception’ e.g. through statements 
 
III. b) IDEOLOGY/MOTIVATION TO FIGHT 
 
Similarly to group’s ethnic identity, a shared ideology can be seen as a factor 
that can decrease uncertainty thus helping to overcome the commitment 
problem by facilitating and supporting group membership. Ideology generally 
refers to “a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or even attitudes, 
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characteristic of a group or community”.75 It is said that ideology motivates 
action76 and according to Morong “Ideology becomes important in times and 
situations where there is uncertainty.” 77 In the public choice literature North 
(1981) sees ideology first of all as an “economizing device by which 
individuals come to terms with their environment and are provided with a 
“world view” so that the decision-making process is simplified.”78 
Since the end of the Cold war debates on the importance of ideology have 
lessened and in the field of civil war studies it has not been considered a 
central theme over the last years. It is thus useful to turn towards the field of 
comparative politics to gain some insights into the importance of ideology for 
the formation of political coalitions on the national level. Theories on policy-
viable coalitions presume that political parties prioritize their policies over 
being in power.79 In addition Axelrod’s (1970) theory on minimal connected 
winning coalitions suggests that while parties are keen to form minimal 
winning coalitions, they are constrained by ideology and try to build alliances 
with ideologically similar/close parties.80 
These theories thus suggest that alignment should be seen between parties 
with the same ideological background i.e. parties closer on the ideological 
spectrum. Transferring this to the civil war context and rebel group alliance 
formation, one can argue that rebel groups that share the same or a similar 
ideology are more likely to form alliances. Thus:  
 
 Hypothesis 2: If two rebel groups are closer on the ideological 
 spectrum, then an alliance between them is more likely. 
 
Operationalization of independent variable: Ideology 
In many of the new multi-party civil wars rebel groups do not state a clearly 
defined ideology such as ‘socialist’ or ‘communist’. The independent variable 
“Ideology” will thus include the group’s motivation to fight i.e. the stated 
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reason for the armed struggle e.g. autonomy, secession etc. Indicators for this 
variable are political statements made by leaders such as founding 
declarations and can also include possible party affiliations and/or links to 
other ideologically-motivated rebel groups.  
 
Independent Variable Operationalization 
Ideology/Motivation to fight  Party affiliations, Political statements, 
founding declarations,  
If not stated clearly can also be the 
stated reason/motivation for fighting 
(autonomy, secession, resistance)  
 
III. c) FOREIGN SUPPORT 
 
External influence and foreign intervention is a reality in most civil wars. 
Current conflicts like in Colombia, Kurdistan, Darfur and Afghanistan “exhibit 
significant cross-border dynamics as well as outside interference”.81 Despite 
the implications of the term “civil wars”, internal conflicts often have a 
significant external dimension to them, since foreign states can play a variety 
of “roles from hosting and facilitating negotiations, offering incentives to 
groups to negotiate, deploying peacekeepers or peace enforcers, and 
providing economic or military support to either side, all the way to sending 
military forces to participate in the conflict”.82 
There is a large and growing body of literature on the causes and effects of 
external involvement in civil war83 including the external support for Insurgent 
groups. Scholars have shown that foreign support for rebel groups changes 
the dynamics of civil wars, since wars with outside involvement tend to cause 
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more fatalities,84 last longer85 and a more difficult to resolve through 
negotiations.86  
 
Sponsoring and supporting another state’s rebel groups is a tactic states often 
use to destabilize rival governments, “as a way of gaining leverage and [in 
many cases [to] combat[ing] their own insurgencies”.87 During the cold war 
these type of conflicts were referred to as “proxy wars”, but even after the end 
of the ideological struggle of “capitalism” versus “communism” supporting 
other state’s rebel groups is a widespread phenomenon. Salyhan, Gleditsch 
and Cunningham (2011) argue that “one cannot fully understand civil conflicts 
without noting the pervasiveness of external support for rebels.”88 
In the context of inter-rebel group alliances and their likelihood, foreign 
support (whether from a foreign government, diaspora group, other rebel 
group etc.) might overcome the commitment problem which emerges due to 
the structural properties of an anarchic environment which makes it difficult for 
rebel groups to trust each other “to uphold the deal”. According to Kalyvas: 
 
political actors external to the community [e.g. foreign 
governments] play a critical role in the conversion of local 
and private conflicts into violence because they provide 
incentives without which local actors would be unable or 
unwilling to undertake violence.89 
 
Therefore, a foreign supporter who provides financial support; delivers 
weaponry or offers rebel groups safe haven or sanctuary on its territory might 
provide the “incentives” necessary for rebel groups to align themselves. As, 
both Christia (2008) and Bapat and Bond (2011) argue, the provision of 
material goods is only one factor facilitating alliances, more importantly foreign 
supporters or “sponsors” can serve as a “guarantor, or capo, that enforces co-
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operation amongst groups”90 or are “external arbiter[s]…necessary to induce 
cooperation among warring groups by doing away with commitment problems 
and spoiler issues”.91 Following the reasoning of those scholars the third 
proposed hypothesis states:  
 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of a common foreign supporter makes 
rebel group alliances more likely.  
 
Operationalization of independent variable: foreign support  
For the purpose of this paper “foreign support” can be conducted by another 
(foreign) state, a diaspora group or another (external) rebel group. The 
variable is operationalized through a number of indicators: a foreign supporter 
can provide safe havens i.e. sanctuary on its territory and can provide 
financial as well as logistical and material support, especially the supply of 
arms. It might also provide political aid and ideological support to the 
movement.  
 
Independent Variable Operationalization 
Foreign support  Provision of safe havens or 
sanctuaries on one’s territory , 
financial support, supply of resources, 
weaponry, political and ideological 
support 
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III. d) ENDOGENOUS TRENDS 
 
 
Set of proposed Hypotheses that will be tested: 
 
 
Independent 
Variable 
Identity  Ideology/Motivation 
to fight 
Foreign support  
 
Hypothesis  
 
Shared/Similar 
identity makes 
inter-rebel 
alliances more 
likely 
 
 
Shared/Similar 
ideology makes 
inter-rebel alliances 
more likely 
 
The presence of a 
common foreign 
supporter makes 
inter-rebel alliances 
more likely 
 
Operationalization  
‘Ethnicity’, 
‘Language’, 
‘Religion’, 
‘tribal 
affiliation’, 
‘own 
perception’ 
Secession, 
autonomy, 
government control, 
Islamist, 
Democratic-secular 
 
Provision of safe 
havens or sanctuaries 
on one’s territory , 
financial support, 
supply of resources,  
weaponry, 
political/ideological 
support 
 
All of the proposed hypotheses are fairly static and do not take into account 
conflict dynamics and possible endogenous trends and effects. This is 
problematic since, in the words of Mary Roldan, “ambiguity is central to civil 
wars” and one of the defining features of conflicts, like the one raging in 
Darfur, are the constant changes and its high dynamism.92 It would thus be of 
interest to examine how endogenous trends could possibly change the 
influence of the three variables: ‘identity’, ‘ideology’ and ‘foreign support’.  
 
There is a recent tendency in civil war literature to assume that even if the 
politics matter at the outbreak of conflict, the internal dynamics of war are 
driven by factors that are not necessarily political.93 
Consequently, one might argue that even if groups form around ethnic lines 
and, initially, see this as defining factor to base their decision whether or not to 
form an alliance with another group on; this might change later on in the 
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conflict. In addition since identities change within conflicts and are deliberately 
instrumentalized by leaders, the effect of identity as a factor that helps 
overcome the commitment problem might weaken. Therefore: 
 
 Hypothesis endogenous trends: identity: The longer a conflict lasts, the less 
 likely “identity” is a crucial factor in the decision to form an alliance.     
 
Similarly, the effects of ideology might decrease as conflicts continue. In many 
long lasting wars, even the ones that emerge out of ideological struggles, as 
the conflict continues the initial (political) motivations for fighting become 
diluted. As Kalyvas proposes civil wars cannot solely be seen as “collective 
actor’s quest for power” but in addition need to be seen as the “local actor’s 
quest for local advantage”.94 Local elites and strongmen become extremely 
opportunistic looking for new economic and political advantages. This leads 
to:  
 Hypothesis endogenous trends: ideology: The longer a conflict lasts, the less 
 likely “ideology” is a crucial factor in the decision to form an alliance.     
 
Even as a conflict continues over a long period of time a foreign supporter can 
reduce uncertainty, increase the benefit of an alliance and thus make its 
formation more likely. However, the presence of one or multiple foreign 
supporters can have direct effects on the members of an alliance: the rebel 
groups e.g. lead to internal struggles and fragmentation. By impacting the 
members of an alliance, foreign support might indirectly have a negative effect 
on inter-rebel alliances.  
  
 Hypothesis endogenous trends: foreign support: A foreign supporter can increase 
 the likelihood of alliance formation, while at the same it can have 
 negative effects on the rebel groups, thus, indirectly impacting 
 alliances.  
 
                                                 
94
 Kalyvas (2003) 486 
Overcoming the commitment problem - 
What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? 
 
 
31 
 
This section offered a brief outlook on the issue of endogenous trends and 
presents some first ideas; the proposed hypotheses will be briefly discussed 
in the final analysis. However, it is important to consider the preliminary and 
highly limited character of this analysis, which can be seen as a base for 
further academic enquiry. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY  
 
IV. a) RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
  
In order to test the above hypotheses and attempt to answer the question 
which factors make inter-rebel alliances more likely, a within-case study will 
be conducted. This within-case analysis will examine two cases of inter-rebel 
alliances within the same conflict: the war in Darfur which officially started in 
2003. The within-case method was chosen since according to David Collier 
“within-case comparisons are critical to the viability of small-N analysis”.95 As 
Collier stated the case study method has the merit of providing a framework in 
which a scholar with modest time and resources can generate potentially 
useful data on a particular case.96 Within the boundaries of a Master thesis a 
large-N analysis of inter-rebel alliances is not feasible, and thus, when 
examining a limited number of cases a within-case analysis presents the best 
choice. In addition, since the topic of inter-rebel alliances is still understudied 
and the academic discourse remains in a phase of theory building, the close 
examination of one case might provide new, useful insights. Robert Yin 
defines case studies as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.97  
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The universe of cases are rebel group alliances in weak, failed or collapsing 
states at a time of multi-party civil war or what Kaldor referred to as “New 
Wars”. Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) argue that civil wars that erupt in strong 
unified states are likely to take the form of irregular wars characterized by a 
power asymmetry, while in cases of weak or collapsed states it is likely to be 
more symmetric. While internal conflicts in strong unified states usually take 
the form of bi-party civil war with an insurgent group challenging the 
government e.g. the Basque’s fight in Spain, in weak, failed or collapsing 
states conflicts are more likely to turn into multi-party civil wars. Inter-rebel 
alliances are more probable in cases of conflicts with a number of different 
actors (rebel groups) involved, therefore in order to answer the question what 
makes inter-rebel alliances more likely, it is useful to look at multi-party civil 
wars in the context of weak, collapsing or failed states.  
The level of analysis are rebel groups, however in some cases, due to the 
dearth in data, the rebel group leader (his identity etc.) will act as a proxy for 
the entire group since his/her choices and decisions are considered as 
representative for the entire group. This approach is flawed and generally 
treating rebel groups as unitary actors is highly problematic, since it harshly 
oversimplifies the inner dynamics of rebel groups and cannot account for 
internal divisions, struggles and group fragmentation which are characteristic 
for “New Wars”. However, for the purpose and objective of this paper this 
simplification will be accepted. Due to the lack in data on rebel groups, 
focusing on their leaders will prove more feasible even though it arguably 
diminishes the explanatory power of the analysis.  
The method of analysis used in this research project will be process tracing 
because this method enables the examination of complex cases in detail and 
assess evidence in order to, “affirm some explanations and to cast into doubt, 
through eliminative induction, explanations that do not fit the evidence.”98 In 
addition this method can play an important role in the development and testing 
of theories, 99 which is precisely what this analysis represents. 
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IV. b) CASE SELECTION 
 
 
In order to conduct a case study cases need to be chosen, according to Stake 
“nothing is more important than making a proper selection of cases. It is a 
sampling problem”.100 The case selection strategy for this paper is based on 
the above defined universe of cases; the cases selected thus need to be inter-
rebel alliances in weak or failed states that are currently experiencing a multi-
party civil war. Sudan i.e. the war in Darfur can be seen as the archetype of 
Kaldor’s “New Wars”; “with extreme ethnically-targeted violence conducted by 
a combination of regular army units and tribally-mobilized paramilitaries, often 
in pursuit of economic goals, [which was] a feature of Sudan’s civil wars from 
the mid-1980s”.101 This complex and highly protracted conflict is characterized 
by a multitude of actors, including a large number of rebel groups, and high 
dynamism with realities on the ground constantly changing. Since this paper 
attempts to identify those factors that make inter-rebel alliances more likely 
and test the proposed hypotheses, any “successful” alliance that fits the 
definition would be appropriate. The cases are selected based on the 
dependent variable - inter-rebel alliance formation – presenting a clear 
selection bias, however, for the purpose of this analysis this choice is deemed 
appropriate. The inter-rebel alliances selected are the early Sudan Liberation 
Army/Movement (SLA/M) as well as the National Redemption Front (NRF). 
Although the Darfur conflict featured a number of inter-rebel alliances, the 
selected cases are the most appropriate for this analysis; first they fit the 
offered definition. Second, as previously mentioned rebel groups in general 
and their alliances in particular have not yet received much scholarly attention. 
As a result only very little data and documentation on the subject exists; the 
case selection was thus also based on considerations of feasibility.  
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IV. c) SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
 
The topic of alliance formation in civil wars has so far not received much 
scholarly attention and accordingly theories and approaches are limited. This 
paper is highly exploratory and therefore its findings need to be regarded with 
caution. For the limited scope of this analysis only three variables have been 
identified and are tested to examine whether they influence the likelihood of 
inter-rebel alliance formation. This paper focuses on factors that may reduce 
uncertainty and thus help overcome the commitment problem between rebel 
groups, but there are a number of possible alternative explanations and 
intervening variables that could influence the likelihood of inter-rebel alliance 
formation, these include: 
 
Group fractionalization, fragmentation  
Personal rivalries between rebel leaders and feelings of revenge  
Possibly presence of (loot able) resources, as suggested by Weintraub 
(2011)  
Rebel group type i.e. rebel group organizational structure, as 
suggested by Furtado (2007)  
Rebel group strength i.e. relative strength, as suggested by Fjelde and 
Nelsson (2012)  
Recent military setback, as suggested by Weintraub (2011)  
Territorial control  
 
 
This leads to the problem of equifinality which might apply to the results of this 
analysis. In addition, as previously mentioned, for the purpose of feasibility 
this paper regards rebel groups as unitary actors - at least in the moment of 
alliance formation - which might lead to oversimplifications.  
 
An important difficulty for this research is that documentation on alliance 
behavior in civil wars is rare, resulting in a dearth in data. The local level in 
this type of conflict has not yet been systematically documented and therefore 
the available documentation used for data purposes may not cover certain 
relevant events, decisions etc. The Data is derived from the best sources 
available such as influential studies conducted by academic Institutes e.g. the 
Overcoming the commitment problem - 
What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? 
 
 
35 
 
Small Arms Survey and detailed historical accounts and analysis by leading 
Sudan experts like Julie Flint, Alex de Waal and Gerard Prunier. However the 
possibility remains that important details will be overlooked. Due to the nature 
of the topic primary sources such as interviews and commentaries in 
newspaper articles made by the leaders will need to be examined with caution 
since there is obviously a bias.  
There might also be a problem of endogeneity since only cases of alliance 
formation can be considered, while the non-formation of alliances (negative 
cases) and factors that cause it cannot be proven. In addition the paper 
focuses on a small number of actors in one conflict and its results are not 
easily generalizable and therefore need to be examined with caution in regard 
to other conflicts,  More research in other conflicts is necessary, including 
possibly large-N quantitative studies.  
Although this paper will be rather restricted in its scope and have many 
limitations, the subject of alliance formation in civil wars requires further 
scientific analysis, and as such, this paper should be seen as a first step. 
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V. CASE STUDIES: INTER-REBEL ALLIANCES IN THE 
WAR IN DARFUR 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Darfur and its borders 
Source: Tanner, Victor and Jerome Tubiana, “Divided they fall: The fragmentation of 
Darfur’s rebel groups” Small Arms Survey HSBA Working paper 6, July 2007. 12 
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V. a) BACKGROUND ON THE WAR IN DARFUR 
 
Situated in the Western part of Sudan, bordering the three Sudanese states of 
Northern and Western Kordofan to the east as well as the state of Bahr el-
Ghazal to the south, the Darfur region covers a territorial area of 
approximately 490,000 square kilometer.102 The region also shares borders 
with three neighboring countries: Central Africa and Chad to the west and the 
Libyan Arab Jamahria to the north.  Darfur which means ‘Land of the Fur’ is 
home to a “host of ethnic groups or tribes – between forty and ninety 
depending on one’s definition”; including the Fur, the Massalit and 
Zaghawa.103 Many of these tribes are also home in neighboring countries 
such as the Zaghawa in Chad.  
Darfur was an independent state and one of the most powerful kingdoms in 
the region for almost three centuries until it was incorporated into Sudan by 
Anglo-Egyptian forces in 1916. In the post-Independence period the region 
became extremely marginalized, in the words of de Waal and Flint “Darfur 
was a backwater, a prisoner of geography”104. The discrepancy between the 
center and periphery throughout Sudan grew; while Khartoum possessed 
immense private wealth and has been developing, the peripheries are “not 
only poor but are subject to processes of subjugation and exploitation” with 
Khartoum playing out its “hyper-dominance”.105 Today Darfur is widely 
considered as one of the least developed areas of the world. 
It is a conflict prone region; in the last decades it has seen a number of severe 
droughts and famines e.g. in 1984, as well as violent conflicts such as the 
First Arab-Fur war in 1987. The past generations have experienced extreme 
patterns of political violence. The current deadly conflict which has been 
raging between government forces and rebel groups since 2003 cannot be 
seen as an isolated event but rather as “the most recent manifestation of a 
pattern of extreme political violence that has afflicted the peripheries of the 
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Sudanese state over many generations”.106 Furthermore, there is not only one 
conflict raging in Darfur, but an intricate web of different types of conflicts 
situated at different levels. El-Battahani identifies five different types of conflict 
in the region that are all “interrelated, interdependent and overlapping”107: 
there are local conflicts involving clans over land ownership, water points and 
pasture; subnational conflicts over local councils between Arabs versus 
“Zurqa”; a national conflict over wealth and power sharing between different 
rebel groups and the central government; regional power struggles with 
neighboring states, as well as an international level conflict involving the 
international community over humanitarian assistance and resources.108 All of 
these conflicts influence the Darfurian rebellion, yet one level which is 
especially important is the “regional” since Darfur’s “recent history is 
inextricably linked to regional security politics” and the competition between 
Chad, Libya, Eritrea and Sudan.109 
The current phase of the “national” Darfur conflict, and the one which will be 
subject of the following analysis, officially started in 2003 when the Sudan 
Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) and the Justice and Equality Movement 
(JEM) took up arms against the Government of Sudan (GoS).  
While considering the following case studies of inter-rebel alliances it is 
important to note that Darfur’s rebels were what Flint and de Waal call: 
   
 an awkward coalition of a handful of professionals who dared 
 to take on the burden of leadership, largely untrained Fur and 
 Massalit villagers, Zaghawa Bedouins feuding with Arab 
 Abbala, and a sprinkling of intellectuals, many of them 
 disillusioned Islamists.110 
 
In contrast to other rebellions like the SPLA in South Sudan the Darfurian 
rebel groups started their rebellion due to their grievances which were a result 
of the marginalization by the central government their region had suffered for 
the last decades and the increasing violence conducted by government 
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backed groups. It was not an “insurgency born of revolutionary ideals, but 
rather a last-resort response to the escalating violence of the Janjaweed and 
its patrons in Khartoum”.111  
 
V. b) THE SUDAN LIBERATION ARMY/MOVEMENT (SLA/M) 
 
 
The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) (Arabic: harakat tahrir as-
Sudan) was the first Darfurian rebel group that started the fight against the 
GoS in 2003. Even though the SLA/M is a rebel group not an alliance between 
different rebel groups, one can argue that is was never a real organization but 
instead was always just a loose coalition of similar but separate tribally based 
movements. This would also explain the many splits and fragmentations this 
rebel group went through in the consecutive years. It therefore fits the 
definition of inter-rebel alliance used for this analysis.  
It is usually considered that the rebellion in Darfur began on the 26th of 
February 2003 when a group calling itself the Darfur Liberation Front (DLF) 
group - later on renamed to Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) - 
claimed an attack on Golo, the district headquarters of Jebbel Marra. 
However, according to Flint and de Waal (2008) “it is difficult to identify a 
single date for the beginning of the rebellion…the most plausible is 21 July 
2001, when an expanded Fur and Zaghawa group met in Abu Gamra and 
swore a solemn oath on the Quran to work together to foil Arab supremacist 
policies in Darfur”. 
The Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) has its roots in the 
clandestine efforts of a group of educated Darfurians who opposed the NIF 
regime and tried to mobilize and eventually join different Darfurian village self-
defense forces in the late 1990s.112 Throughout the 1990s the level of 
violence in Darfur increased and as a result different tribes started to organize 
their own small resistance and self-defense groups to defend their villages 
and respective areas. These tribes include the Massalit, Zaghawa and Fur, 
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this resistance however was always local and there was no coordination 
between different groups, especially not beyond tribal borders. In 1996 three 
young Fur activists including Abdel Wahid Mohamed al Nur formed the 
nucleus of an organization which subsequently became the SLA/M. After 
organizing the activities of the Fur resistance, by collecting money and rallying 
for support, the group sought to “situate the Fur struggle in a Darfur-wide 
context”.113  
In the late 1990s and 2000 Abdel-Wahid and his group initially attempted to 
reach out to the leaders of the Massalit– the group which was more similar to 
the Fur. However, the Massalit’s own struggle had experienced a setback 
when their leader Khamis Abakir was imprisoned by the GoS and his group 
was engulfed “in the middle of war”.114 As a result the first alliance the Fur 
forged was with the Zaghawa, which took place in the summer 2001 by 
swearing on the Quran as previously mentioned. This alliance “proved central 
to the birth of the SLA”115 since the relationship at the heart of the SLA is “the 
unlikely and unstable alliance between Fur and Zaghawa”.116 The Masalit 
joined the struggle later on in November of the same year.  
 
Foreign support: 
The SPLA/M enjoyed support from different governments and groups. Early 
on in the effort, the Fur and Zaghawa rebels looked for logistical and political 
support within Sudan and turned to the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance 
(SFDA) of former governor Ahmed Diraige. Diraige did not support the idea of 
armed rebellion and as a result the Darfurian rebels did not receive help from 
the SFDA. In turn, John Garang, leader of the SPLA, contacted the SLA/M 
and proposed cooperation. The SLA received logistical, military and especially 
political i.e. ideological support from the SPLA. They received both weapons 
and military training from the South Sudanese rebel group, but their most 
obvious influence was the slowly emerging political program and ideological 
orientation. The new name (SLA/M) adopted by the DLF in March 2003, 
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reflected the SPLM tutelage and the writing of its 2003 manifesto was assisted 
by SPLM officers. Supporting the Darfurian rebels “helped create the western 
front the SPLA had pursued since 1991 and provided leverage as the peace 
process117 gained momentum from 2001.”118  
The group also received support from Eritrea which became the man conduit 
for external support of the Darfur rebellion. The Eritrean government had 
previously supported the armed struggle in South Sudan, providing the SPLA 
with ammunition, passports and training and now used the rebellion in Darfur 
to gain even more leverage over Khartoum.119 
Another supporter of the SLA was Chad, in contrast to Asmarra the support 
for the Darfurian armed struggle did not come from the highest level of the 
regime. The Chadian government actually officially assisted GoS to fight the 
rebels.120 Nevertheless the SLA did receive support in the form of arms from 
members of the Zaghawa group in the Chadian army as well as presidential 
guard, there is evidence that “Chadian government agents were acting on 
their own initiative”.121  
 
The following section will identify each of the SLA/M member’s “identity”, 
“ideology” and their “foreign support”.   
 
 
Identity:  
All three ethnic groups whose resistance movements constituted the SLA/M 
are indigenous Darfurian: the Fur, the Zaghawa and the Massalit. They thus 
shared a common Darfurian identity.  
 
 
Ideology/Motivation to fight: 
The case of the early SLA/M as an inter-rebel alliance is a clear example of 
how Christia (2008) defines alliances between rebel groups in multi-party civil 
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conflicts; the different groups were fighting for their survival and their 
motivations were primarily security driven. As Khamis, a Massalit SLA 
commander, stated “They began burning villages twice…We had no choice 
but to organize. We were fighting for our lives”.122 The different tribal groups 
that constitute the SLA/M did not previously have any political agenda and 
therefore one can argue that in the beginning of the rebellion they did not 
follow a clear ideology. It was only once the organization had formed and with 
the assistance of the SPLM that a political manifesto and clear political goals 
were states. As previously mentioned this rebellion was not the result of 
ideological struggles but the fight for survival. Survival and resistance was at 
the core of this movement, as Flint (2007) argued for the SLA resistance 
came first, ideology later.123  
 
Foreign support: 
Some of the three tribal resistance movements had received foreign support 
prior to the formation of the SLA/M. The Zaghawa in particular enjoyed 
support from a number of foreign governments; they were represented in 
government and security services in both Khartoum and N’Djamena, as well 
as received support from Libya.124  
The Fur resistance led by the student activists received ammunition from 
kinsmen in the Sudanese army that was distributed among the self-defense 
groups as well as financial support by Fur diaspora.125 There was no evidence 
found on the foreign support for the Massalit.  
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V. c) ANALYSIS: SUDAN LIBERATION ARMY/MOVEMENT 
(SLA/M) 
 
 
Group Leader Identity Ideology/motivation for 
fighting 
Foreign 
Support  
Fur 
restistance 
 Fur Resistance/survival  Fur 
diaspora 
Massalit 
resistance 
 Massalit  Resistance/survival 
 
No 
evidence 
Zaghawa 
resistance 
 Zaghawa  Resistance/survival  Chad, Libya 
 
 
 
The first hypothesis proposed that a shared i.e. similar identity makes inter-
rebel alliances more likely. All three resistance movement share a Darfurian 
identity, however they are three different and separate tribes. While the 
Masalit and Fur are very similar, both being Non-Arab sedentary farmers and 
the alliance between them supports the hypothesis, the Zaghawa are camel 
nomads and had previously clashed with, among others the Fur, over grazing 
rights. The Zaghawa are traditionally seen as raiders and warriors126, they are 
also regarded as being wealthier, dominating Darfur’s trade and commercial 
sector and after the 1989 coup were close to the NIF regime. Flint and de 
Waal call the alliance between Fur and Zaghawa as “unlikely”, since the Fur 
had only little trust in the Zaghawa.127 It was this alliance that was at the heart 
of the SLA/M and which provided its backbone, the evidence presented here 
thus seems to suggest that a shared i.e. similar identity was not a defining 
factor in the formation of the alliance.  
 
The second hypothesis suggests that an inter-rebel alliance is more likely if 
rebel groups either share the same ideology or are close on the ideological 
spectrum. In the case of the three tribal resistance movements one can argue 
that neither of the groups followed a clear ideological path. Their motivation to 
fight was born , not out of an ideological struggle, but a fundamental need of 
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survival. The reason for the armed struggle was thus the same for all three 
groups. This case supports the claim that a similar ideology i.e. a similar 
reason for fighting makes an inter-rebel alliance more likely.  
 
The third hypothesis states that the presence of a foreign supporter reduces 
uncertainty between rebel groups and thus increases the likelihood of inter-
rebel alliance formation. This claim is supported by the evidence presented 
above; the rebels received military, logistical and political i.e. ideological 
support from the SPLA and the Eritrean government.  
 
The following section will examine the second case of an inter-rebel alliance 
during the conflict in Darfur: the National Redemption Front (NRF). 
 
V. d) THE NATIONAL REDEMPTION FRONT (NRF) 
 
The National Redemption Front (NRF) (Arabic: jebhat al-khalas al-watani) is 
an alliance of the non-signatory groups, which was formed on June 30th 2006 
in Asmarra, the capital of Eritrea. This alliance was a response to the signing 
of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May 2006 in Abuja, between the 
GoS and a faction of the divided SLA lead by Minni Minawi (SLA – Minni). 
According to its founding declaration the NRF consists of three rebel groups: 
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a hold-out faction of the Sudan 
Liberation Movement (SLA/M) and the Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance 
(SFDA). The declaration was signed by Dr. Khalil Ibrahim the JEM leader and 
previous NIF leader, Khamis Abdalla Abaka the dissident SLA faction’s leader 
(SLA/M G-19) and two representatives of the SFDA; Sharif Harir and Ahmed 
Ibrahim Diraige, former governor of Darfur and initially chairman of the new 
movement.128 
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In the NRF founding declaration they state:   
 
 We leaders of political and military organizations abstaining 
from signing the Abuja document…reaffirm our rejection of 
that faulty process. Realizing the virtues of combining 
efforts and resources to National Redemption Front (NRF), 
as an instrument for coordinating  political, military, 
diplomatic, and media initiatives.129 
 
Both in the declaration and in statements following it e.g. made by Ibrahim it 
was made clear that that this new alliance would accept any other movement 
opposing the Abuja agreement and the policies of the GoS generally.130 
Although not directly a signatory of the declaration,131 the G-19 was part of the 
NRF due to a military coordination agreement between the JEM and the G-19 
field commanders that was signed in Bir Mirge, in the Wadi Howar area of 
North Darfur a few weeks before the official founding of the NRF.132 According 
to Africa Confidential “the G19 appears to be a key element of the newly 
formed National Redemption Front (NRF).133 
 
In addition a number of SLA factions that did not officially join the NRF, as the 
Fur groups led by Abdel-Wahid and Abdesh-Shafi, “associated themselves 
with the NRF but chose to retain a measure of autonomy”.134 According to the 
definition of an ‘inter-rebel alliance’ used in this paper these groups are still 
considered to be part of the alliance since they align themselves with them. In 
addition there is evidence that the NRF reinforced the Fur fighters with 
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vehicles, weapons, stores and troops in September 2006 and that Non-NRF 
Fur fighters repeatedly joined NRF attacks on government forces.135 
As an alliance the NRF “can be confusing”136 since a number of different 
groups were officially and unofficially involved, while parallel processes of 
rebel group fragmentation and fractionalization took place.137 This however, 
reflects one of the general issues of the Sudan i.e. Darfur conflict; the issue of 
the multitude of actors involved and its highly dynamic character. For the 
purpose of this paper the big, main rebel groups that made up the NRF i.e. 
that were collaborating with them will be observed: JEM, SFDA and G-19.  
Although there had been accusations that the NRF was a diaspora creation 
(since many of the rebel leaders were not on the ground in Darfur) with little 
effect on the situation on the ground, the NRF did prove, between June and 
October 2006, to be a “highly effective military coalition if not a political 
success”.138 After a number of successful fights e.g. the Um Sidir battle on 
September 11, 2006 and increasing attacks on oil installations at the end of 
November 2006; the estimated number of NRF fighter was around 10,000 
men.139 In August 2006 analysts from Africa Confidential called the NRF “not 
only opposition to the DPA but to Khartoum’s NC regime – the kernel of a 
revived Northern opposition”.140 Although this alliance started to disintegrate 
at the end of 2006 due to internal problems and in June 2007, after several 
failed attempts to elect an executive body, was at the verge of disintegration 
with its members working alone on the ground141; it can still be considered to 
have been a relatively successful alliance and had been one of the most 
important conflict actors at that time. According to a Small Arms Survey 
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document from November 2006 the NRF was considered the “primary rebel 
army in Darfur” at that time.142 
 
Foreign Support: 
The National Redemption Front (NRF) received support from a number of 
different foreign governments. Chad supplied the rebel alliance with weaponry 
and logistics143. According to Africa Confidential:  
 
It [NRF] is getting support from Chad’s president Idriss 
Deby Itno who wants it to help defend Chad’s border 
against Khartoum’s proxy militias. Recent Janjaweed 
attacks into the Chadian area of Dar Silah helped create 
fresh recruits for the NRF inside Chad.144 
 
The Sudanese Government has openly accused the government of Chad of 
supporting the rebel alliance in 2006.145 
A second known supporter of the NRF is Eritrea146. The NRF is both based in 
the Eritrean capital of Asmarra and its founding declaration was signed there. 
The Eritrean government is both “consistent and opportunistic, and had been 
trying since 1995 to open a western front against Khartoum”147, it had 
previously supported the SPLA, as well as the SLA/M and the JEM.   
There is also some evidence that the NRF received support from Libya148, 
according to the UNMIS Media Monitoring report from the 25th of July the 
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movement received seventy land cruisers from Libya as well as the 
permission to recruit fighters from Libya.149 
 
 
The following section will analyze each of the rebel groups that were part of 
the National Redemption Front, regarding their “identity”, “ideology” and 
“foreign support”. 
 
 
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM): 
 
The Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was the second Darfurian rebel 
group that announced itself a few weeks after the SLA in 2003. However, its 
beginnings can be traced back to as early as 1996. The JEM was established 
in 2003 by a “group of educated, politically experienced Darfurians” many of 
whom were former members of the National Popular Congress Party (NPCP) 
of Hassan al-Turabi.150 In the years leading up to the outbreak of conflict in 
Darfur in 2003, regime insiders had become increasingly disenchanted by 
Sudan’s Islamist leader. In May 2000 a secret twenty five-man committee 
from the six states of Sudan published The Black Book: Imbalance of Power 
and Wealth in Sudan which presented a detailed account of the political and 
economic marginalization of regions within Sudan, including Darfur. The 
authors were persecuted by the GoS but in the following three years the JEM 
was created.  
 
Leadership:  
The undisputed leader of the JEM is Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed a “highly 
educated, superb organizer…as a descendant of Zaghawa sultans on both 
sides of his family, he enjoyed respect and support among the tribal leaders of 
the Darfur native administration”.151 He had served as the state minister for 
education in Darfur between 1991 and 1994, was state minister for social 
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affairs in Blue Nile in 1997 and took up the post of advisor to the governor of 
Southern Sudan in 1998.152 
 
Group’s identity: 
The JEM was formed by men who had previously held positions in regional 
government under the NIF, including its leader Dr. Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed. 
Since its founding members had mostly come from Islamist parties, it is said 
to have “Islamist roots”. At the same time there was an ethnic dimension i.e. 
tribal, according to the Small Arms Survey “most of its leader and membership 
initially came from the Kobe tribe, a Zaghawa sub-group more numerous in 
Chad than Darfur.153 According to Prunier: “JEM is an almost exclusively 
Zhagawa movement with few combatants…and a lot of money”.154 The 
“identity” of the JEM is thus defined as Zhagawa (-Kobe), which played an 
important role since as Flint and de Waal argue “the movement’s core was at 
tribal at least as much as it was Islamist”.155  
 
Ideology/Motivation to fight:  
Despite a “stiff dose of tribalism”156 and inner quarrels157, due to the perceived 
domination of Kobe within the group, according to Flint: for the JEM “ideology 
initially came first”.158 It is an Islamist group with strong links to Hassan al-
Turabi’s National Popular Congress Party (NPCP), a split wing of the ruling 
National Congress Party (NCP).159 According to Seymour (2010) JEM was 
“not a peripheral insurgent force, but one with access to the powerful Islamist 
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movement at the center of power in Sudan and with connections to 
governments in neighboring states”.160 
 
The five point Manifesto published by the JEM early in 2003 was similar to the 
one published previously by the SLA, demanding: 
 
 Justice and equality in place of social injustice and political 
tyranny; radical and comprehensive constitutional reform 
that would guarantee the regions their rights in ruling the 
country; basic services for every Sudanese, and balanced 
economic and human development in all regions of the 
country.161 
 
Similar to other rebel groups the JEM fights for a decentralized federal state 
and rules out self-determination of single Sudanese provinces and regions. 
However, the JEM “laid even greater stress on the need for national 
solutions”.162 In contrast to other rebel groups such as the (early) SLA/M the 
neglect and marginalization of Darfur was not the prime concern of the JEM 
leadership, instead the political objective of this group was the unity of 
Sudan.163 As its leader Khalil stated: 
 
 The most important aim behind our movement’s taking up 
arms is the fear of the country being torn…we oppose the 
secession of any part of Sudan…we will not lay down arms 
until after the government falls, or a fair political settlement 
is reached for all the peoples in Sudan’s  provinces”164   
 
From very early on it was clear that JEM had a national agenda for political 
change. In part two of The Black Book which was published on the JEM 
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website in August 2002, the group called for a “comprehensive congress” to 
redress injustices perpetrated by a small group of autocratic rulers”165 
In addition the JEM with its Islamist background does not openly discuss the 
separation of state and religion. According to the JEM website the group 
states that religion has been manipulated both by the government “for political 
reasons that brought together nothing good to the people or to the state” as 
well as by the SPLA which had “exploited religion in order to gain western aid 
and support”.166 In regard to the ideas of religious freedom the JEM follows a 
position consistent with mainstream northern Sudanese political thought which 
“treads a fine line between constitutional secularism and enshrining Shari’a for 
Muslims”.167 They officially state that while Islamic law should not be imposed 
on non-Muslims, “the believers of others faiths must not opposed Muslims’ 
attempts to apply the laws of their religion to themselves”.168 
 
 
 
Foreign support: 
The evidence pointing to JEM’s foreign support is ambiguous. While Sudan 
specialist Gerard Prunier (2008) argues that they do not receive any foreign 
support, since with the split from the NCP; “The Turabi wing retained control 
of most of the money and has used it – inter alia – in financing the JEM.169 
Other scholars, such as Seymour (2010), note that the JEM had links to other 
foreign governments.170 The relationship between the JEM and Chad has 
been complex due to intricate patterns of conflict and cooperation between 
Zaghawa elites.171 The JEM leader, Khalil Ibrahim, posed a threat to Deby’s 
position “at the top of the Zaghawa social and political hierarchy”.172 
Nevertheless, Darfurian rebels received arms and ammunition from members 
of the Chadian army.173  In addition according to an article in the Independent 
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the JEM received political and financial support from Libya.174 According to 
Flint (2008) after the Darfur rebellion began Eritrea supported both the SLA 
and the JEM; Asmarra became the main conduit for external support for both 
rebel groups providing fuel, food and weapons.175 
 
 
 
The Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance (SFDA): 
 
The Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance is a Darfur diaspora opposition 
movement that was founded in 1994 and is lead by Ahmed Diraige.176 This 
group is considered more political than military177, it does not possess large 
military capabilities on the ground and was part of the national resistance 
umbrella group: the National Democratic Alliance (NDA). In addition its leader 
had initially opposed armed rebellion and overruled its deputy Sharif Harir’s 
recommendation to adopt the SLA as the SFDA’s military wing in 2003.178  
 
 
Leadership:  
The group’s president is Ahmed Diraige who is a member of the Fur tribe and 
was born to a shartai (paramount chief). Diraige was governor of Darfur from 
1980 to 1983 and was considered the first locally accountable governor. He 
warned President Nimeiry in 1983 in the famous “famine letter” of the danger 
of a coming drought in Darfur, but since this directly opposed Nimeiry’s vision 
of Darfur being “the future breadbasket of the Arab world” he issued an arrest 
warrant forcing Diraige into exile in London. He has not returned to Darfur and 
remains in exile.  
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The second in the SFDA’s leadership was Sharif Harir, a Zaghawa who acted 
as the deputy chairman of the SFDA. He actively fomented the armed 
rebellion from Eritrea from the year of 1995 onwards.179  
 
 
Identity:  
The identity i.e. ethnic identity of the SFDA is not easily defined. In contrast to 
rebel groups that are made up of mostly the same ethnic groups and were the 
ethnic identity serves as a factor that contributes to the group’s cohesion e.g. 
the JEM; the SFDA does not seem to have predominantly tribal affiliations i.e. 
ethnic concerns at its core. However, for the purpose of this paper the group’s 
identity needs to be identified according to the chosen criteria.180 The rebel 
leaders Ahmed Diraige’s and Sharif Harir’s identity will thus be used as a 
proxy for the entire group’s identity. Since the two leaders Diraige and Harir 
have different ethnic identities, the SFDA is defined as a multi-tribal i.e. multi-
ethnic rebel group: Fur-Zaghawa.  
 
Ideology:   
SFDA’s charter “A new political structure for the Sudan” which was published 
in January 1994 states that the aims of the movement are: 
 
 To create a political order free from racism and religious 
intolerance,  one which ensures individual freedom and 
promotes the common interests of all the Sudanese people, 
and to this end, to promote a democratic process that 
accommodates differing political views and basic freedoms 
based on clearly stated laws.181 
 
The SFDA’s aim is to create a united, democratic federal Sudan, while being 
secularist. According to the Political Handbook of the World 1999, the SFDA 
considers “all means legitimate” in its aim to end the al Bashir regime and 
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proposes a “substantially decentralized federal structure for Sudan in which 
the traditional parties would play no role”.182 
 
 
Foreign support: 
The known foreign supporter of the SFDA is Eritrea. Since the year of 1995 
Sharif Harir has been actively fomenting armed rebellion in Darfur from his 
Eritrean base.183  
 
 
The Group of Nineteen (G-19): 
 
The Group of Nineteen (G-19) was a new but highly disparate collection of 
former SLA commanders from the North of Darfur who started to join forces in 
the months following the conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement. Its 
leaders were united in their opposition to the peace agreement, personal 
experience of the abusive power of SLA-Minawi and “a determination to 
reunite the rebel movement under new leadership”184. Although these 
reformers had initially aligned themselves with Abdel Wahid’s faction they 
became disgruntled with his leadership style. Although they did not reject him 
altogether, they “froze” him because of his “inflexibility, rigidity, grudge [and] 
division” and established a Transitional Revolutionary Council under Vice 
Chair Khamis Abdallah.185 
The G-19, which as commanders from other factions joined, was later on 
renamed SLA-Unity, were, according to Africa Confidential in 2006 “the real 
power that emerged in Darfur earlier this year”186. According to Flint (2007) by 
late 2006 the G19 “was the strongest force on the ground in Darfur”.187 
However, this rebel group failed to establish clear political and military 
structures.  
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Identity: 
The G-19 is a multi-tribal movement and includes fighters and leaders from 
the Zaghawa, Fur, Meidob, Messalit and Berti tribe. The identity of the group 
can thus be defined as multi-tribal: Zaghawa, Fur, Messalit and Berti.  
 
Ideology/Motivation to fight: 
The G-19 was originally part of the SLA/M and emerged as a separate rebel 
faction only as concerns over the SLA/M leadership style and the opposition 
to Minni Minawi grew. The fragmentation of the SLA/M was not a result of a 
change in attitudes towards the ultimate goal of the struggle, thus, one can 
argue that the G-19’s fundamental motivation to fight is still consistent with the 
SLA/M’s ideology.  
The SLA’s manifesto was drafted in Southern Sudan in January 2003 by a 
SLA delegation from Darfur with the help of senior SPLA officials. The 
manifesto which was made public on March 6, 2003 clearly reflected John 
Garang’s vision of a “New Sudan”, Garang was seen by both Abdel-Wahid as 
well as Minni Minawi as an ideal. The SLA manifesto demands a secular, 
decentralized state with the right of self-determination as basis for “viable” 
unity, and calls for the “restructuring of power and an equal and equitable 
distribution of both power and wealth in all their dimensions”.188 When 
considering the SLA’s ideology, one needs to consider that John Garang, 
leader of the SPLM/A, as the ideal of the SLA’s leadership, rejected all 
ideologies, believing that “a country must depend on the rights of citizenship – 
not on ideology”.189 Thus Flint (2008) argues that “for the SLA, resistance 
came first and ideology later”.190  
The G-19 did not publish a manifesto and never established clear political and 
military structures; nevertheless they did publish statements.  In a statement 
issued on March 6th 2006 the nineteen SLA members called for a single 
negotiating position at Abuja, called for unity within the multi-tribal movement 
(SLA) and urged for a Darfur-Darfur dialogue to “lay the foundation for stability 
                                                 
188
 Flint (2007) 160  
189
 Ibid.,144 
190
 Ibid.,160 
Overcoming the commitment problem - 
What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? 
 
 
56 
 
and development in Darfur”.191 The initial nineteen reform-minded 
commanders wanted closer ties to the traditional tribal leaders and “signaled a 
new desire to build bridges to sectors of Darfurian society which had been 
sidelined in the SLA’s “revolution””.192 They called for a “complete change of 
ideas and behavior” by the rebel forces.193 
 
Foreign support: 
There is no evidence of foreign supports for G-19 prior to the National 
Redemption Front. This, however, should not come as a surprise since this 
rebel group only emerged as a separate entity in the months following the 
conclusion of the Darfur Peace Agreement on May 5th 2006.  
One could argue that this split-group possibly still received some support from 
its former supporters194, the SLA had previously enjoyed support by the 
governments of Eritrea, arguably Chad as well as from the SPLA/M.   
 
V. e) ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL REDEMPTION FRONT 
(NRF) 
 
 
 
 
Rebel 
group 
Leader Identity Ideology/ 
Motivation to fight 
Foreign 
Support  
JEM Khalil Ibrahim 
(Zaghawa-
Kobe) 
Zaghawa – 
Kobe 
 
Islamist, affiliations 
with Turabi’s NCPC 
 
decentralized 
federal state, ruling 
out self-
determination 
Eritrea, Libya  
 
G -19 Khamis 
Abdallah 
Abebka 
(Messalit) 
multi-tribal: 
Zaghawa, Fur, 
Messalit and 
Berti  
“resistance comes 
first ideology 
later”195 
 
secular, 
No evidence 
for foreign 
support  
 
Previously 
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decentralized state 
with the right of self-
determination 
 
SLA: 
Eritrea, 
Chad, SPLA 
SFDA Ahmed 
Diraige (Fur) 
Sharif Harir 
(Zaghawa) 
multi-tribal: 
Fur - Zaghawa 
Federal Democratic 
state, secular  
Eritrea 
 
According to the first Hypothesis proposed, an inter-rebel alliance is more 
likely if the (ethnic= identity of the groups is alike i.e. similar. All the rebel 
groups that constitute the National Redemption Front (NRF) are Darfurian 
groups that oppose the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) of 2006.  They thus 
share some identities. However, taking into account the ethnic identity of the 
groups as operationalized for this paper, these groups are very different. 
While the G-19 and the SFDA are both multi-tribal and include members from 
the same ethnicities, the JEM is primarily made up of just one particular 
subgroup of a Darfurian tribe. This evidence seems to suggest that the same 
i.e. similar ethnic identity was not a factor in this alliance formation.  
 
The second Hypothesis proposes that an inter-rebel alliance is more likely 
when the groups are closer on the ideological spectrum. Once again there are 
overlaps in all three groups’ motivations to fight; all of them strive for a 
Sudanese state that is decentralized, where citizens from all regions are 
treated equally and no marginalization takes place. Both the G-19 and the 
SFDA fight for secular states, while in contrast the JEM with their Islamist 
background do not exactly specify their perspective on the issue of the 
separation of state and religion. In this regard the rebel groups are clearly far 
apart on the ideological spectrum.196 Although the SFDA and G-19 are very 
similar in their motivation and stated aim of fighting, forming an alliance with 
the JEM seems to weaken the proposed hypothesis. 
 
The third Hypothesis stated that the presence of a common foreign supporter 
who provides logistical, financial, military or political support reduces 
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uncertainty and makes inter-rebel alliances more likely. There is some 
evidence for this claim; all members of the NRF had previously had backing 
from foreign governments, the government in Asmarra had actually supported 
all three rebel groups, to different degrees. The National Redemption Front 
(NRF) itself enjoyed support from Chad, Eritrea and Libya. This evidence 
seems to suggest that the presence of a common foreign supporter reduces 
uncertainty between groups, thus making alliances between more likely.  
 
 
VI. ANALYSIS  
 
Summary of Case findings: 
VI. a) IDENTITY  
 
The first hypothesis stated that a shared i.e. similar identity decreases 
uncertainty and thus helps overcome the commitment problem faced by rebel 
groups. The findings from the two cases do not support this claim. The 
evidence suggests that identity is not a factor that makes inter-rebel alliances 
more likely. These findings support Christia’s claim (2008) that a shared 
identity does not drive alliance formation.  
 
However, ethnic identity does play an important role in the Darfur conflict, 
according to Africa Confidential:   
 
 tribal, clan and historical ties remain important in defining 
allegiance…in the run up to the conference [Darfur rebel 
commander’s conference 2007] politically unlikely alliances 
Alliance  Identity Ideology/Motivation for fighting  Foreign support 
NRF    X 
SLA   / X 
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emerged driven by history and kinship ties across 
movements197 
 
Endogenous trends: 
There is still some evidence that a shared identity is considered important by 
rebel leaders; however, the significance of it might decrease as the conflict 
continues. A second hypothesis on the endogenous trend of the significance 
of identity for alliance formation stated that the longer a conflict lasts the less 
crucial a shared identity will be for the decision to form an alliance. There is 
some evidence for this claim since when the Fur resistance initially looked for 
partners to ally with they turned towards the Massalit first (the groups which is 
more similar to them) and only then turned toward the Zaghawa. It would be 
interesting for future research to examine whether difference in identity 
ultimately make inter-rebel alliances less likely. 
 
 
VI. b) IDEOLOGY/ MOTIVATION TO FIGHT 
 
The second hypothesis claimed that an alliance is more likely between rebel 
groups that share the same or a similar ideology i.e. that are close on the 
ideological spectrum. With only this limited number of cases the evidence is 
not entirely conclusive; in the case of the NRF the groups did differ in regard 
to their ideology, while all members of the SLA shared the same motivation to 
fight. A difficulty with this hypothesis is that many rebel groups do not have 
clearly defined ideologies, when considering the motivation for fighting as an 
indicator overlaps are greater, but the explanatory power is reduced.  
 
 
Endogenous trends: 
The hypothesis regarding the endogenous trend of the second variable 
proposed that as the conflict prolongs ideology becomes less important a 
factor in leader’s decision to form an alliance. Once more, there seems to be 
some evidence for this claim. In the beginning of the Darfur rebellion, after 
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some joint military operations between the SLA and JEM, Abdel Wahid and 
Minni Minawi both ruled out further cooperation due to JEM’s Islamic past.198  
However, later on in the conflict the groups did ally in the National 
Redemption Front (NRF) and other inter-rebel alliances later on in the conflict. 
 
VI. c) FOREIGN SUPPORT  
 
 
The third hypothesis claimed that the external/ foreign support by another 
government, diaspora or rebel group makes inter-rebel alliances more likely. 
The evidence from the two case studies supports this claim; common foreign 
support seems to be a factor that helps overcome the commitment problem by 
reducing uncertainty, thus making inter-rebel alliances more likely.   
 
Endogenous trends: 
Foreign support by one or more parties seems to increase the likelihood of 
inter-rebel alliances, however, it is not entirely unproblematic since it can also 
undermine cooperation and in addition might have detrimental effects on rebel 
groups e.g. can lead to further fragmentation. Foreign support, thus, can also 
have an indirect impact on e.g. the longevity, strength and effectiveness of an 
alliance. An example of foreign support undermining cooperation was support 
by Chad that the NRF received which, ultimately triggered a split within the 
alliance between factions that were close to N’Djamena and others that were 
keen on showing their independence from external powers.199 Similarly, 
SPLM/A support to the SLA lead to Zhagawha suspicion of Garang’s 
favoritism for Abdel Wahid, which “laid the foundations for the subsequent 
split between Fur and Zaghawa factions in the SLA”.200  
In addition in many conflicts there are multiple external supporters involved; 
but the “presence of multiple foreign backers diminishes the external backer’s 
leverage” and thus could also decrease its capability as a “guarantor” or 
                                                 
198
 Flint (2007) 151 
199
 See Tanner and Tubiana (2008) 39 
200
 Seymour (2010) 
Overcoming the commitment problem - 
What factors make rebel group alliances more likely? 
 
 
61 
 
“external arbiter”.201 It would be compelling if future research on inter-rebel 
alliances considers these features of foreign support and further examines its 
effects.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
What factors make inter-rebel alliances more likely? Answering this question 
was what this analysis set out to do, and thereby, shed light on a critical 
phenomenon of many multi-party civil wars, which remains yet understudied. 
This paper proposed that rebel groups, just as nation states, find themselves 
in an anarchic context and as a result are trapped in a multi tiered dilemma; 
on the one hand they face a security dilemma which leads them to strive for 
cooperation, on the other hand they face the commitment problem and fear 
betrayal. In order to overcome the commitment problem three factors i.e. 
variables were presented that are expected to reduce uncertainty and thus 
make inter-rebel alliances more likely: a shared ‘ethnic identity’, similar 
‘ideology’ and common ‘foreign support’.  
The evidence from the two cases of inter-rebel alliances in the conflict in 
Darfur suggest that the first two variables ‘ethnic identity’ and ‘ideology’ do not 
increase the likelihood of alliance formation. However, the third variable 
‘foreign support’ was supported by the evidence. The presence of a common 
foreign supporter who acts as a guarantor and can provide incentives 
increases the likelihood for an inter-rebel alliance to form. 
This study was highly exploratory and its findings are not easily generalizable, 
but it should be seen as a first step toward a more comprehensive and 
systematic study of this intriguing phenomenon. There is a definite need for 
further enquiry and extensive academic research. In the future studies of rebel 
group alliances should not only examine the onset of this type of cooperation 
but take into account the strength, duration and effectiveness of rebel 
alliances. In addition, the phenomenon of rebel group fragmentation and inter-
rebel alliances are inextricably linked in many conflicts. A more 
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comprehensive approach which takes into account a rebels group’s inner 
dynamics in relation with its propensity to form alliances would be useful.  
 
In conclusion, there are many factors that influence a rebel group’s leader’s 
decision to form an inter-rebel alliance, but, according to the findings of this 
analysis, one factor which increases the likelihood of its formation is the 
presence of a common ‘foreign supporter’.  
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